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Spooky
05-05-2001, 01:28 PM
Inspired by Hell(euphorbia), Piano, RW et al

What is liberty?

Liberty is a concept that we hear so much about, but at the same time we have real trouble actually understanding. Why do I say this? Well if we look at the history of the concept we can see that it has meant differing things for differing people. Yet we know that each group has held it as a truly high value. We speak of liberty in the same way we speak of freedom. As, for example freedom of speech, religion, writing, association, participation in the political process. The idea itself has even been extended to include such things as economic liberty, freedom from want, and even national self-determination. In fact as the theorist Bernard Crick put it: 'So important, indeed, is the concept of liberty that we are all reluctant to define it too closely, wanting to apply it to everything we value.' So lets look at that little word liberty, and see if, now in the modern/contemporary world, we can see what it means and possibily come to some sort of definition.

Liberty can find its roots in the ancient times. The ancients, like the greeks and the romans, understood liberty as being important. But, the ancient concept of liberty is far from the what we would consider liberty to be today. For the ancients, liberty was associated with the state's ability to conquest. It meant the freedom of ones own state was compatible with denying the liberty of other states. It also menat for the ancient not being subject to despotic power. To remove the master and slave relationship that exist in despotism.

One of the interesting aspects of ancient liberty is therefore the contrast in the emphasis of todays understanding of the term. Unlike today the emphsis is not on the freedom of the individual from political control and interference. In the case of the ancients liberty was compatible with the authority of the community over the individual so long as this authority was exercised according to the law, and not the will of a despot.

It was only in the 16th and 17th century that the notion of liberty and freedom became a general condiiton that ought to be shared equally amongst all citizens of a state. In a sense, the growing passion for liberty at this time was a direct reaction to the expansion of the modern state and the centralisation of power. This is where the first difficulty for the thinkers of liberty arose. As the calls for liberty and freedom became more apparent in theorists work, so too did the need to establish the limits to which the state could constrain liberty. Thus the difficulty lied in finding a way and justification for the limitation of liberty without it degenerating into license by the state.

The German philosopher Immanual Kant came up with a way of resolving this issue. Kant thought that freedom was a matter of autononmy. A matter of self-determination as a self-governing agent. But this self-governing did not mean liberty and freedom to do what one happened to wish. It meant stipulating laws for oneself based on morality, and those laws ought to be set with the condition that they were laws that one would wish to see other agents following. This notion of liberty however is problematic in itself, something which I will come back to in a moment.

As the debate and thought on liberty went on, the English utilitarian J.S.Mill argued for a differing, but equally influential strategy to liberty from Kant. Without going too deep into Mills' ideas, Mill, distinguished between two opposing types of action that man could do. These were 'self-regarding' and 'other-regarding' actions. In other words Mill saw that actions against one self shoudl not be contrained, whether they caused harm to the person or not. The only issue where constraint on liberty was justified was where actions harmed others liberty. Again, like Kant this idea is problematic, and I will show you why in moment.

The next thinkers in the line on liberty were those that were truly radical. Another englishman George Winstanley was the first of these radical, and the first to use economics within his notion and coceptualisation of liberty. For Winstanley, the oppresson of liberty lie in the ditribution of land which denied some men access to the very measn of subsistence. He asked, along with his peers, what the use of political and civil liberties was when the majority of the population lacked the econmic resources to use them. This notion, of liberty in economic terms is where Marx and Engels picked up, along with the socialists, in analysing not how things ought to be, but ways in which to change how things were.

But, it should be made clear here, that is not a necessity to be a marxist to argue that liberty and social justice are linked. Liberalism, of which this piece is a defence, also argues this. However, the difference between the liberal argument and that of the soicalist are very apart.

So, what do the liberals see as liberty? And how did it differ from the socialists and marxists, while maintaing similarities? The answer to this can be found in the way in which liberty exists throughout the ages. What elements of liberty are consistant throughout each of the theories already put forward? The answer to this question is that there are two concepts of liberty that run through these ideas. That of negative liberty, and that of positive liberty. Negative liberty, is simply the 'freedom from' restraint. While positive liberty is the 'freedom to' do what one wants.
So negative and positive liberty are the answers to two distinctly different questions. The first, negative, of: 'What is the area in which a subject, or person, should be free to do or be what they want without the interference of another person or body of persons? And the second, positive, of: 'What or who is the person or object that can control a persons action to do what they wish to do or be? I think, that it would be fair to say that this is the central dilemma, or paradox if you will, of the very notion of liberty. On the one hand, the state appears as a threat to liberty, and on the other hand the state also appears as the guarantor of liberty. This dilemma is a classic example of the oppositon of negative and positive liberty. The next question that arises is therefore is: Which of these two concepts is more preferable?

The answer to this question is arguably that of negative liberty. Why? you may ask. What is wrong with wanting the freedom to do as I please like the concept of positive liberty? To be ones own master? A slave to no man? The problem, with the positive concept of liberty is thus.

Earlier on I mentioned that both Kant's and Mill's ideas of liberty were problematic. Arguably, both these thinkers, along with others of their school, were all advocates of the positive concept of liberty. That of being ones own master. Admittedly, Mill, accepted that their would be too a degree some interfernce, but he also noted that there ought to be a absolute boundary where one ought not be interfered. In essence both writers were champions of the notion of the individual. The problematic points of their thought are different, but arguably will lead to the same thing if followed.

If you remember, Kant was concerned with autonomy along the guideline of personal moral code. That this code ought to be based on how one wished others to be. The problem here lies in that the not all men would necessarily be capable of this. It also lies in the idea that ones on moral code is based on how one wishes others to be. In essence the result of Kant's concept is that man is 'forced to free'. That man is coerced into liberty by the very nature of the belief in ones own moral code. I ask the question: How can coercion into positive liberty be liberty at all?

As with Kant, Mill's concept of liberty is problematic, but in a different way. Remember Mill notion of 'self-regarding' and 'other-regarding'? For Mill, the actions of a man, on himself, should be his free decision and liberty to do. That interference should only apply when others liberty may be harmed. The problem here is that Mill failed to see that almost everything that we do can harm others liberty, whether it is self-regarding or not.

The reason for this is that man is a social being. After all, am I not what I am, to some degree, in virtue of what others think and feel me to be? If I ask myself the question: What am I? I may answer, an Englishman, a techie, a man of no importance. If we then look at this we see all these attributes contain the element of being recognised within some particular group or class. This recognition is part of the meaning of of some of my most personal characteristics. As Isaiah Berlin put it:

'It is not only that my material life depends on interaction with other men, or that I am what I am as a result of social forces, but that some, perhaps all, of my ideas about myself, in particular my sense of my own moral and social identity, are intelligible only in terms of the social network in which I am an element.'

So, our individual selfs are not something that we can detach from our relationship with others, for that relationship is what makes us what we are. And this my friends is the problem with Mill's concept of liberty to do what one wish in respect to the self. The flaw lies not in neccesarily in the notion of liberty or freedom, but in the premiss of the individual as a detached element of existance.

And so we return to the idea of positive and negative liberty. Negative liberty, the freedom from things such as interfernce and coercion is how liberty ought to be perceived. The length to which these interferences extend are not what is under examination here though. That is, admittedly a matter for infinte debate. How far can control enter into our lives is not what I am trying to address. Liberty as an idea, and what it actually is the subject of discussion. We can see that there are two conepts, two faces if you will to liberty.

The positive face is that which can lead to what it intended to avoid. The forcing of man to free, the coercion towards liberty. The negetive in comparison accepts the necessity of some from of political control, and is concerned with mans 'freedom from' and not 'to' something. Negetive liberty, I believe is the true liberty that we all believe, for it is the one that maintains our freedom to choose whereas positive liberty forces us to free, which is not liberty at all, but simply despotism.

For all of us that live in the Western World I stand here now and maintain that we are all liberals. Whether, Conservative, Labour, Republican, Democrat, Libertarian or Reform, I believe that almost all of us see liberty in the negative concept. The freedom 'from' oppression and interference, and not the freedom 'to' do as we please. This is the liberal way. What we argue about is the extent to which this interference should extend, but what we believe is still the same concept, that of negetive liberty. For if we follow the the path of positive liberty, then as Benjamin Constatnt warned: 'The danger is that absorbed in the enjoyment of our private independence and in the pursuit of our particular interests, we should surrender our right to share in political power too easily.'

If you managed to read this far then I commend you. I know it was long and hope it made some sense. Thank You.

[This message has been edited by Spooky (edited 05-05-2001).]

Koliedrus
05-05-2001, 01:37 PM
Wow!

I'll read that more than once!

Bravo! The door is now open http://www.thehypertribe.net/ubb/smile.gif

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Subdivided.

Spooky
05-05-2001, 01:42 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE><HR>Originally posted by Koliedrus:
Wow!

I'll read that more than once!

Bravo! The door is now open http://www.thehypertribe.net/ubb/smile.gif
[/quote]

Thanks. It took me three days to read what was needed to write it. I think it comes across quite well, or at least I hope it does.

Pianomahnn
05-05-2001, 03:05 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE><HR>Originally posted by Spooky:
Inspired by Hell(euphorbia), Piano, RW et al

[/quote]

I haven't made it past this line yet, but I can tell it will be awesome. I mean, I helped inspire this literary work of art. http://www.thehypertribe.net/ubb/biggrin.gif

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Buddha's Penis!
05-05-2001, 03:11 PM
i read it, and will reread it to make sure i have absorbed the points fully.
this post has no content. i just wanted to make sure sp00ky knows i'm reading, and to encourage essay-type submissions.

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you don't know anything until you know everything.

MAC
05-05-2001, 10:53 PM
yeeeeeeeeee

I'm going to review the positive and negative liberty part.

That whole "forcing man to be free" thing will make a good new thread

allow me a day or so to review


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Don't shake the devil's hand and say you're only kidding.

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MuffyTheVampyreLayer
05-06-2001, 07:18 AM
He he spooky, good shit.
This happens to be an area I have done WAY too much study in... so.. heres my analysis of negative and positive liberty.

Negative Liberty: "Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within which a man can act unovstructed by others." (Berlin) Such a person is free in this sense to the extent that no one interferes with his or her activity.

Positive Liberty: A person who is free or at liberty in this sense is "a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for his or her choices and about to esplain them by reference to his or her own ideas and purposes".

The extent of one's negative liberty is thus a function of the extent to which one is free from the interference of others. The extent of one's positive liberty is a fucntion of the extent to which one governs oneself. Even if others do not interfere with me thre might still be sources of illness, accident, and so forth that undermine my positive liberty. One is negatively at liberty if there are no obstacles imposed by human agency, whether externally, in the form of road blocks etc, or internally, in the form of my manipulated and false beliefs to which I have no alternatives. Even if one is in this way negatively at liberty, however, it is still possible that one ight lack the native wit or talent to be ones own master in these matters. This is perhaps most clearly seen in the case of children, or in the case of other humans whose incompetences are not caused by human interference. Roughly speaking, some measure of negativel liverty seems necessary, but not sufficient, for positive liberty.

Under Berlins account, we start with the OK metaphor of self mastery or self governance, but then we add that we can also be slaves to nature, or even to our own passions, and that positive liberty requires our mastery of those too. But now we have a distinction between two selves, the higher or real one, and the lower one, that needs to be controlled and governed.

But then it is only a short step to regard this real self as actually a collective self, of which each individual is only a part. But then it is only a short step to say that positive liberty requires that this collective or organic real self control and govern its individual members, the lower selves. But then it is only a short step to totalitarianism. Berlin concedes that negative libertarians too might be believers in 'two tier selves', and they too might come to regard interferences with the higher self of individuals as the only real interferences. Berlin argues that the dangers are much greater with positive than with negative liberty.

MacCallum, however, argues (quite successfully in my opinion), that freedom or liberty is always a triadic relation: x is (not) free from y to do (or not do) z. On this view, there is no logically important distinction between positive and negative liberty.

"whenever the freedom of some agent or agents is in question, it is always freedom from some constraint or restriction on, interference with, or barrier to doing, not doing, becoming, or not becoming something. That is, it is always freedom or liberty of someone, from something, to do or be something or someone"

If one thinks there is such a distinctive thing as negative liberty, it remains to be settled what is to count as a freedom restricting impediment, constraint, or interference. For example, should we agree with Rawls that 'inability to take advantage of one's rights and opportunities as a result of poverty or ignorance, and a lack of means generally' is only a matter of the worth of liberty, and not a matter of liberty itself? At one extreme is Hillel Steiners view that an individual is unfree if, and only if, his doing of any action is rendered impossible by the action of another individual. At the other extreme end is the idea that an individual is free if and only if, her choice of action is rendered more difficult or less desirable for her, by the action of another individual.

On this latter sort of account, offers will typically not be liberty restricting, because they will merely add options to an already existing choice set, and so will not restrict or make more difficult or less desirable action from that choice set. Threats, on the other hand, will be pardigmatic cases in which liberty is restricted, on these accounts.

On Stieners account, a threat of course is not an interference in liberty unless it makes certain actions impossible.

On the other hand, all accounts discussed here are agreed that only impediments, constraints or interferences arising from the actions of agents count as restrictions of freedom. Diseases arising from by biology, or incapacities arising from my being caught in a naturally caused avalanche, are on these views, not restrictions of my freedom. A difficulty for this, however, is that 'natural events; might still nevertheless sometimes be ones for which someone is responsible. For example, the ski patrol or the Homer tunnel supervisors might be responsible for not having spoted and dealt with the potential avalanche. My doctor or pathologist might be responsible for not having spotted my early stage disease when it could have been nipped in the bud. And so on.

It seems clear that these issues of figuring out when and with whom personal responsibility arises are themselves moral issues. It is hard to see that liberty can be characterised independently of these issues. Even those who are agreed that negative rather than positive liberty is central to political theory and philosophy have wide scope for disagreement.

There are also issues about who or what is free, about the distribution of freedom, and about the scope of that freedom. One issue about scope concerns whether only interferences in a persons actual desires or goals count as interferences in that persons negative liberty. The trouble with this is that those who have learned to trim back their desires (to avoid inevitable disappointment, etc) won;t then be regarded as having their liberties restricted by actions that would count as interferences in the liberty of somone with more ambitious goals. This seems dubiously to bias the account in favour of those who have immodest ambitions. In response, negative libertarians have suggested including the desires one ight have, as well as the ones one does have. The trouble is that the desires one might have seem infinite in their possible scope and variety, thus threatening to make the overall account unworkable.

There ya go!!! I hope that gave you some stuff to chew on http://www.thehypertribe.net/ubb/wink.gif

Spooky
05-06-2001, 09:15 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE><HR>Originally posted by MuffyTheVampyreLayer:
One is negatively at liberty if there are no obstacles imposed by human agency, whether externally, in the form of road blocks etc, or internally, in the form of my manipulated and false beliefs to which I have no alternatives. [/quote]

I would say Muffy, that this is not entirely correct. This analysis of the negative concept imples still that all policy formulation by external groups/bodies of person are not compatible with negative liberty. (Or am I reading that wrong?)

<BLOCKQUOTE><HR>
Under Berlins account, we start with the OK metaphor of self mastery or self governance, but then we add that we can also be slaves to nature, or even to our own passions, and that positive liberty requires our mastery of those too.[/quote]

This is essentially an ananylis of kant's thought on freedom, within the confine of the positive/negative theorum.

<BLOCKQUOTE><HR>
MacCallum, however, argues (quite successfully in my opinion), that freedom or liberty is always a triadic relation: x is (not) free from y to do (or not do) z. On this view, there is no logically important distinction between positive and negative liberty.
[/quote]

Upon first glance one might agree with this statement. I will admit myself that on first reading of Berlin, I found it hard to see how the two concept as being logically distinct. However, they are when you look at the the questions that they answer. For positive liberty is found in the to answer the question; 'Who govern me?', while negative liberty is found in the answer to 'How far does government interfere with me?

<BLOCKQUOTE><HR>
That is, it is always freedom or liberty of someone, from something, to do or be something or someone"
[/quote]

The flaw with this anaylsis my friend is the assumption of necessity that it contains. How, I ask, can you statement be true in the case of say, a man being tortured. That man is being oppressed, not necessarily because of a desire to 'do something' as you put it. It may be that that man is being oppressed simply because a despotic power desires to oppress. Thus the agent is if he were not oppressed by the wim of the depsot would be at liberty, but not by necessity being 'doing' something. Additionally the flaw in this conception of liberty is that it is quite compatible with despotism.

If say a liberal minded despot decided to give his subjects the freedom of action to do things. As is simply your requirement and rule for what liberty is. Then the sum result is that under your analysis of what freedom and liberty is, it is perfectly fine to live under despotic rule. How can a theory liberty that works under despotic rule be liberty at all? Strangely, and I don;t know if its intentioanl Muffy, but your analysis is almost identical to Mill's which as I said is flawed by his assumptively weak anaylsis of what an indeividual is.

<BLOCKQUOTE><HR>If one thinks there is such a it remains to be settled what is to count as a freedom restricting impediment, constraint, or interference. [/quote]

As I believe I said. I agree that this is the source for infinite debate. The extent to which someone liberty may be constrained is not however what I eer dintended to discuss. What I discussed was the nature of liberty itself along the line of negetive and positive aspect of the term.

<BLOCKQUOTE><HR>
For example, should we agree with Rawls that 'inability to take advantage of one's rights and opportunities as a result of poverty or ignorance, and a lack of means generally' is only a matter of the worth of liberty, and not a matter of liberty itself?
[/quote]

It depends on how one chooses to look at it really. What you are referring to here is economic liberty. As such I would argue that the same positive and negative elements can still apply within the example. Although admittedly we steering away from the point of what the concept means in its purest form, and moving towards the addition of other concepts as an extension of the original term.

<BLOCKQUOTE><HR>
At the other extreme end is the idea that an individual is free if and only if, her choice of action is rendered more difficult or less desirable for her, by the action of another individual.
[/quote]

This is Mill.

<BLOCKQUOTE><HR>
all accounts discussed here are agreed that only impediments, constraints or interferences arising from the actions of agents count as restrictions of freedom.
[/quote]

I partly agree. But as I said, someone can have negetive liberty in the sense of freedom from oppression by a despot. Without the necessity that the agent is trying to do something.

<BLOCKQUOTE><HR>
It seems clear that these issues of figuring out when and with whom personal responsibility arises are themselves moral issues. It is hard to see that liberty can be characterised independently of these issues. Even those who are agreed that negative rather than positive liberty is central to political theory and philosophy have wide scope for disagreement.

I would not agree that these are based on morals. For morals are personal and not absolute. They differ from person to person. The basis of negative liberty is that we should have the freedom from interference. Of course, as I have said the extent to that freedom is open fro debate and I admit that freely. But in it purely metaphysical form the conceptualisation of the terms are lofgcally distint in the questions there answer.

[quote]
In response, negative libertarians have suggested including the desires one ight have, as well as the ones one does have. The trouble is that the desires one might have seem infinite in their possible scope and variety, thus threatening to make the overall account unworkable.


I think it dangerous to to include desire, and the passions when analysing the extnet to which negative liberty extends. For, essentially it trying to wed the two concpets of negative and posiitve liberty and produce some dialetic from them. The probelm with this for me personally is still the notion of being 'forced to be free'. The element of coercion therefore on the part of negetive libertarians who may follow the ideas of some dialtetic will essentially remove my liberty to choose and force me into a liberty of their choosing. That is not liberty, that is despotism.

Good points btw Muffy, although admittedly I don;t agree with them because alot seem to stem from a defense of Mill and Kant, whom although brilliant thinkers, are entriely out of date and logically flawed in the contemporary world IMHO.


[This message has been edited by Spooky (edited 05-06-2001).]